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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of Islam, particularly the Chinese Muslim scholars’ participation in the nation-
building of the People’s Republic of China. It also looks at the political narrative of the CCP on Islam in the 
context of the Chinese revolution. Anti-imperialism and socialist construction were the two primary political 
goals allowing people to be politically engaged and consequently create a common ground for recognition. 
Hence, religion was considered as merely another form of ideology which needed to be incorporated into the 
political mission leading toward human liberation. The internationalist support of the anti-colonial struggles in 
the Arab World also played a crucial role in the formation of the national recognition in the 1950s. The reports 
on the Chinese political support towards the Arab world presented the Arab people as a unity with their 
revolutionary spirit rooted in Islamic religious tradition and inspired by their recent history of being oppressed 
by colonialism. 
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Introduction
On October 24 1952, readers of the People’s Daily across China saw the news about 
a ‘Chinese Muslim Hajj delegation returned to Beijing from Pakistan on October 5th’. 
During their stay in Pakistan, the delegates received ‘a warm welcome’ and ‘attended 
banquets hosted by Egyptian ambassador and Saudi Envoy to Pakistan’. Their 
arrival was ‘extensively covered by the Karachi local newspapers’. The delegates 
also introduced the ‘reality about the significant improvement of the ethnic equality, 
religious freedom, and the living conditions of all ethnic groups believing in Islam’.2 
Buried underneath the news on Korean War, this brief report might seem inconspicuous. 
After all, this was merely about a failed first attempt for the newly established People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) sending a formal Hajj delegation to Mecca. 
As the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the 
People’s Daily is widely regarded by the Western critics as a ‘political instrument’ for 
‘mass education’ under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s firm grip.3  Considering 
the significance of the People’s Daily, it seems rather odd for today’s observers that 
a story about a failed religious outreach to the Arab World could appear as its front-
page news. Researchers have long noticed the PRC’s political use of the Hajj mission 
as a form of ‘people’s diplomacy’ to extend connections with the Middle Eastern 
and North African (MENA) nations (Shichor, 1979, pp. 41–45).4 However, attentions 
are almost exclusively devoted to the successful ones organised after the PRC’s 
diplomatic triumph at the Bandung Conference in 1955. 
Nevertheless, the story presents the cooperation between ethnic-religious groups 
and the Communist central government. Failed or not, this trip marked one of the 
very first diplomatic ice-breaking attempts of the PRC to establish formal relations 
with the Arab nations. It also demonstrated an intricate cooperative relation between 
religion and state in the early PRC period. The 1952 Hajj mission was organised by 
the newly formed Chinese Islamic Association Preparation Committee (中国伊斯兰
教协会筹兰委兰会, CIAPC, later became the Islamic Association of China, 中国伊
斯兰教协会, IAC in 1953) headed by Burhan Shahidi (包尔汉), a Chinese Uygur 
revolutionary leader and then the chairman of the PRC’s Xinjiang Provincial People’s 
Government. One of the vice directors of the committee was Da Pusheng (达浦生), 
a Muslim scholar and Hui Chinese born in Jiangsu, a coastal province at the estuary 
of Yangtze River. 
2 ‘Woguo Yisilanjiao Chaojintuan yi Fanjing zai Bajisitan Shoudao Dangdirenmin Relie Huanying (The 
Islamic Haji delegation of our country returned to Beijing They received a warm welcome by the local 
people,’ People’s Daily, 24 October 1952, page 1. 
3 Regarding the Western perspective on the People’s Daily, see one of the earliest systematic narratives on this 
topic in the English-speaking world (Houn, 1958-1959).
4 Some researchers even go a step further and called the Hajj delegations organised by the PRC as the ‘Hajj 
diplomacy’. (See Al-Tamimi, 2013, pp. 60–62). 
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The delegation was dispatched only a month after the initiation meeting of the 
CIAPC. Led by Imam Da Pusheng and Imam Imin Mesum (伊明·兰合兰木), an ethnic 
Uyghur and veteran of Uyghur independent movement, the group consisted of 16 
members. All delegates were highly influential Imams (阿訇, Akhoond), Islamic 
scholars and Muslim community leaders from Hui and Uygur ethnic groups. Some 
members on this team of 16 people were Chinese Azharites such as Pang Shiqian 
(Muhammad Tawadu Pang, 兰士兰, 1902-1958) and Zhang Bingduo (Sulaiman Zhang, 
兰秉兰, 1915-2004), and many had already been to Mecca during the Republican period.5 
However, as citizens of the PRC, which at the time had no diplomatic relation with 
Saudi Arabia, the delegates had to rely on Pakistan’s facilitation to apply for visas 
to Mecca. After waiting in Pakistan for over a month, none of their visa applications 
was successful. However, during their stay in Karachi, apart from meeting political 
and religious elites in Pakistan, the delegates also attended receptions hosted by 
Chargé d’affaires of Saudi Arabia and Ambassador of Egypt. Their primary focus 
was to showcase the ‘significant improvement in the living condition of different 
ethnic groups in the PRC’ and introduce ‘the PRC’s policy on ethnic equality and 
religious freedom’.6
1952 was a volatile year for the PRC. Apart from the intensification of the Korean 
War, the internal riots of ethnic groups also posed as threats to the new state. On 
April 2nd and 4th, two uprisings led by Ma Zhenwu’s (马震武) Jahriyya order took 
place in Guyuan (固原), Ningxia and Zhangjiachuan (张家川), Gansu respectively 
(Gladney, 1996, p. 136; Stewart, 2018, pp. 31–32). The incidents happened in less 
than two months after the PRC’s central government announced the implementation 
of the regional ethnic autonomy system. The spiritual authority of the religious 
leader in ethnic minority groups could still be competitors to the state, similar to 
the situations in late imperial and Republican China. Traditionally, the ‘protests and 
clashes’ between the state and different ethnic and religious groups receive most of 
the scholarly attention. Under the dominating discourse of identity politics, such 
a perspective assumes the primordial quantities of ethnic and religious identities, 
projecting a naturally confrontational interethnic relation in the PRC (for examples, 
see:  Rong, Gönül, and Xiaoyan [2016],  Rudelson, [1997]; Gladney, [1991]; Israeli, 
[1980]). The state, in this context, as a hegemonic presence, functions as a ‘manager’ 
and extends its top-down tight ‘control’ over different domestic social groups to 
5 For historical account of the Chinese Muslim students studying in al-Azhar, see Mao (2016).  John T. Chen 
gives an excellent discussion about this transnational exchange of Chinese Hui students studying in al-Azhar 
prior-1949 in relation to the formation of their political and historical subjectivity. Chen’s study primarily 
focuses on Pang Shiqian (see J. T. Chen, 2014; also see, Y. Chen, 2016). Regarding the Hajj trips in the 
Republic period, see Y. Chen, 2016, pp. 75-78). For personal memoirs and collection of historical documents 
regarding the dispatch of Hui students in the 1930s, see Bozhong and Na (2011). For  the historical account 
of the intellectual exchanges between China and the Egypt before 1949, see  Benite (2014).
6 Woguo Yisilan Chaojintuan yi Fanjing’ (Our Hajj Delegation returned to Beijing), People’s Daily, October 
24, 1952, 1st page
İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYOLOJİ DERGİSİ
270
maintain the status quo (Leung, 2005). Religious groups under such a political 
structure are believed to be suffering the most in the atheistic Communist party-state 
(Dillon, 1994; Doyon & Thornely, 2014). 
Apart from the apparent Cold War stigma assuming the common behave of a 
‘communist regime’, such a reading of the situation fails to recognise the complexity 
of the PRC’s ethnic relations in the Chinese socio-political context. However, it is 
always dangerous to assume the universality of what the term ‘religion’ signifies and 
its relation with the ‘state’. It is insufficient to presume that the same socio-political 
pattern could encompass all the stories about the end of empire and the rise of the 
nation-state across the globe. In the case of China, while the Chinese Empire as a 
political institution of governance broke down, its territorial extent remains more or 
less intact. The new republic also inherited the ethnic diversity from the old empire. 
This reality calls for a sincere query of the modern Chinese history and reviews the 
terminologies in our theoretical arsenal to see if there are any ahistorical Western-
centric presumptions of universality. 
Throughout the history of Chinese state-making and nation-building, there are also 
countless cases which the spiritual authority of religious groups was offered or gained 
by forming a partnership with the central political power. In the Chinese context, Islam 
is the only religion associated with ethnic groups and regarded as an integral element 
in Chinese cultural heritage. Two major ethnic groups are Hui and Uygur. Many 
recent studies have revealed the Chinese Muslims’ active participation in the national 
salvation movements against the Japanese invasion (J. T. Chen, 2014; Mao, 2011). 
The characteristic of Islam being a world religion also played a crucial part in 
determining the way which Chinese Muslims were involved and treated in the modern 
Chinese nation-building process. In the early years of the PRC, Chinese Muslim groups 
were the conduit to champion the state’s diplomatic outreach to the Arab/Islamic 
nations in searching for an international United Front against imperialism. The role of 
Chinese Muslim groups, particularly the IAC in extending and facilitating diplomatic 
links with Arab countries received extensive scholarly attention (for example, see 
Brazinsky, 2017; Gladney, 1994; Wang, 1993). Nevertheless, the common practice in 
the existing historical investigations is to look at 1949 as a watershed moment which 
abruptly separates the object of study into two. Such a story-telling is only complete 
if we believe that the top-down regime change creates two isolated universes, each 
with its unique habitat with no prior history behaving distinctively from each other. 
Otherwise, we must break away from the conviction that the regime change severs 
the lineage of human history. Instead, we could look at the cooperation between 
ethnic-religious groups and the Communist central government in the modern history 
of Chinese nation-building and searching for national salvation. This remained the 
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case until 1958 when the anti-right movement began to severely influence the ethnic 
and religious affairs (He, 2004, pp. 110–111).7 
This paper addresses the construction of affinities, an aspect in the complex 
dynamic between the central authority and minority groups in the society which only 
recently begins to receive some scholarly attention from historians on empires such 
as David Cannadine (Cannadine, 2002). It also echoes Robert Bellah’s application of 
the Rousseauian concept ‘civil religion’ when discussing the cohesive force in the US 
that drives its cultural and social integration among different groups (Bellah, 1980, 
p. 17). This paper focuses on Muslim intellectuals and prominent religious figures 
who are ethnically Huizu (回族, Hui ethnic group). It examines the representation 
of and presentation by these Hui individuals in the public domain with a specific 
interest in understanding the way that Islamic religious discourse was entangled 
in consensus building in the early PRC period before 1958. It hopes to elaborate 
on how the ethnic identity of Hui and the religious identity of Muslim reconcile 
and even resonate with the Chinese national identity of ‘Zhonghua Minzu’ (中兰民
族，literally Chinese nation). This paper particularly interests in understanding the 
role of the discourse and politics of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial internationalism 
and human liberation in facilitating the making of the common political subjectivity 
known as ‘Zhongguo Renmin’ (中国人民, literally means Chinese people). 
Hui as a ‘National Question’
National Question is universal in nature. It unfolds across the world but takes 
different shapes in various socio-political contexts. On the practical level, the CCP 
began to systematically examine the issue of the relation between ‘Huizu’ and 
‘Huijiao’ (回教, Islam) in the late 1930s, soon after the formation of an Anti-Japanese 
United Front in 1937. In his Report to the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Politburo 
of the CPC in October 1938, Mao Zedong elaborated the importance of this unity 
in ensuring the success of the anti-Japanese War and establishing the republic. He 
stated that the anti-Japanese struggles marked a ‘great unity and progress across the 
country’. The ‘only way’ to ‘triumph in this protracted war’ is to ‘unite all ethnic 
groups, strive for progress and rely on the masses’. He particularly emphasised that 
such a unity ‘is not across all the political parties and social classes, but also across 
all the ethnic groups in China’. This is to ‘counter the enemy’s plot to dissociate all 
the ethnic minorities from our nation’. Hence, one of the most urgent missions ‘at this 
point is to unite all the ethnic groups into one’. In order to achieve this purpose, ‘all the 
ethnic groups such as Mongol, Hui, Tibet, Miao, Yao, Yi, and Fan should have equal 
rights as Han’. Under the principle of unity against Japanese invasion, all the ethnic 
7 In 1958, Li Weihan (李维汉, 1896-1984), the then Minister of the United Front Work Department gave a talk 
about Islam and the social development of Hui people. He particularly pointed out the religious obligations 
such as Zakat and Ramadan held back the social development of Hui communities (see Li, 1987).
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groups ‘should have the right to self-governance’, while at the same time, ‘unite with 
the Han people to establish a unified nation’. Under this principle, we should ‘rectify 
the mistake of Han Chauvinism, respect the cultures, religions, and customs of ethnic 
minority groups’. The Han people should also avoid ‘using insulting languages and 
committing abusive actions against them’. Only through the ‘self- propelled strive for 
rights by the ethnic minority groups’ and the ‘implementation from the government’ 
can we achieve the’ true improvements of ethnic relations in China’ (Mao, 1983).
Mao’s elaboration on the ethnic issue concerning the nation-building process sets out 
the guideline and principles for the ethnic autonomy in both the CCP-controlled base 
areas (根据地) and later the PRC. Under this guideline, the Association of Research 
on National Question in the North West Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP 
edited a comprehensive narrative based on the investigation of the Hui minority in the 
CCP-controlled area. This edited volume was officially published in 1941 in Yan’an. 
It strongly criticises the Japanese narrative which promotes the ‘self-determination of 
Hui’ to establish a Hui nation-state through secession (Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, 1980, pp. 
83-95). To simplify the ‘Hui’s problem’ (Huihui Wenti, 回回问题) as a religious issue 
is a ‘representation of Han Chauvinist attitude’. Another ‘fallacy’ it challenges is the 
‘pan-Islamic attempt’ to ‘fabricate a so-called Islamic ethnicity’, which stated by the 
editors is associated with the imperialist colonial expansion (Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, 
1980, pp. 105-06). It particularly criticises the ‘Japanese imperialist advocacy’ of the 
‘Islamic nationalist movement’ in China as a way to single out the ‘ethnic groups 
believed in Islam’ and ‘put them on the opposite side of the Chinese unity against 
Japanese invasion’ (Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, 1980, p. 107).8  
The recognition of Hui’s problem as a ‘national question’ raises a main theoretical 
and legal concern. How is the concept of ‘self-determination’ defined? More 
importantly, should the CCP recognise the right to secession as Lenin did? These 
concerns echo the classic debate between Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg over 
the issue of ‘national question’ in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. When facing 
the issue of ‘self-determination’, the CCP inevitably has to address the reality of 
ethnic diversity inherited from the fallen empire without breaking the unity apart. 
Apart from referring to the strategic utility of forming solidarity against the Japanese 
invasion, the CCP developed a theoretical understanding of national problem through 
the discourse of class liberation. The CCP recognised that the Hui people received 
oppressions from two sides, namely the international imperialism represented 
8 For historical account of the Chinese Muslim students studying in al-Azhar, see Mao (2016).  John T. Chen 
gives an excellent discussion about this transnational exchange of Chinese Hui students studying in al-Azhar 
prior-1949 in relation to the formation of their political and historical subjectivity. Chen’s study primarily 
focuses on Pang Shiqian (see J. T. Chen, 2014; also see, Y. Chen, 2016). Regarding the Hajj trips in the 
Republic period, see Y. Chen, 2016, pp. 75-78). For personal memoirs and collection of historical documents 
regarding the dispatch of Hui students in the 1930s, see Bozhong and Na (2011). For  the historical account 
of the intellectual exchanges between China and the Egypt before 1949, see  Benite (2014).
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through the Japanese invasion, and the domestic ‘national oppression’ (Minzu Yapo, 
民族压迫) inflicted mainly by Han Chauvinism. Hence, instead of focusing on the 
self-determination aspect, the CCP’s attitude towards ‘national/ethnic question’ 
emphasises on equality.
Theoretically, the CCP’s take on ‘national question’ is closer to what Rosa 
Luxemburg’s criticism against Lenin. Luxemburg’s analysis is rooted in the socio-
political context of Poland. The rise of Polish nationalism in the early 19th century, 
as Luxemburg argued, is fundamentally different from the nationalist recognition 
formed in the Central European nations. The root of Polish national aspirations, 
according to Luxemburg, is the ‘natural-feudal economy’ rather than ‘modern 
capitalist development’ that gave birth to nationalisms in Central European nations 
in the 19th century. Henceforth, Luxemburg rejects to assume that the nation-state 
unequivocally suggests national ‘independence’. Instead, she recognises ‘nation-
state’ as the ‘class dominance of the bourgeoisie’ with a strong tendency of adopting 
‘protectionist policy, indirect taxation, militarism’ and consequently leading towards 
‘war, and conquest’ (Luxemburg, 1976, pp. 175-182). In the case of Poland the true 
‘national movements’ for liberation ‘vanished’ when the feudal economy died out 
due to the hegemonic expansion of colonialism. This process also ‘transplanted’ the 
class of bourgeoisie ‘into the Polish soil’. For the genesis, the Polish bourgeoisie, 
who advocates for self-determination and establishment of a nation-state, is ‘clearly 
an anti-national factor’ (Luxemburg, 1976, p. 176). The ‘“national” movements’ 
and ‘struggles for “national interests” in all the ‘modern societies’ are ‘usually class 
movements of the ruling strata of the bourgeoisie’ (Luxemburg, 1976, p. 137).
Based on the Polish historical context, Luxemburg rejected the assumption that 
there is a universal ‘formula’ of ‘the right of all nations to self-determination’. 
She particularly points out that such a formula will do more harm than good in 
‘smaller and petty nations’. Without positioning the smaller nations in the context 
that capitalism in the 19th century excised its hegemonic power globally, the pursuit 
of their ‘independent existence’ will just be ‘an illusion’. She states that ‘hopes 
of solving all nationality questions within the capitalist framework by ensuring 
all nations, races, and ethnic groups the possibility of “self-determination” is a 
complete utopia.’ (Luxemburg, 1976, pp. 129-131). Luxemburg argues that the 
rights of nations should not be the standard for socialist parties when discussing 
the national problem. She considers concepts such as nation, right, and the will of 
the people are ‘remnants from the times of immature and unconscious antagonism 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie’. In this sense, the ‘national question’ 
is fundamentally a ‘question of class interests’. For the ‘class-conscious and 
independently organized proletariat’ to use these concepts would be a ‘historical 
contradiction’ (Luxemburg, 1976, pp. 137-138). 
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Lenin’s defending of the right to self-determination, on the other hand, 
should also be read in the unique political context of Russian Empire. Similar to 
Luxemburg, Lenin is acutely aware of the socio-political context when discussing 
the national question (Lenin, 1964, pp. 410-414). Different from Poland, Russia was 
predominantly an imperialist power in the 19th century with the feudal landlords as 
the ruling class. The ‘Great Russians in Russia are an oppressor nation’. The ‘creation 
of an independent national state’, in the early 20th century, ‘remains the privilege 
of the Great-Russian nation alone’. Hence, by rejecting the ‘right to secession’ 
for small nations in Russia, argued by Lenin, Luxemburg is ‘in fact assisting the 
Great-Russian Black Hundreds’. To Lenin, advocating the right to secession for the 
weak and small nations is to fight against the Great-Russian oppression to the other 
nations in the Russian Empire. It helps Russia to ‘clear the road to its freedom’, 
consequently forms a crucial component of the Russian revolution for liberation and 
equality (Lenin, 1964, pp. 409-413). 
According to Lenin, the global expansion of capitalist Produktionsverhältnisse 
in the late 19th century also brought the oppressive relation between powerful and 
weak nations to the world. Most of the countries in the East were colonies or semi-
colonies of the Great Powers. Hence, the ‘awakening’ of national movements for 
self-determination among these nations were undoubtedly challenging the unequal 
world order dominated by the strong nations (Lenin, 1964, p. 400). However, we 
should also notice that while accepting the ‘right to secession’, it is important to 
acknowledge the greater unity based on the proletarian class recognition. Lenin uses 
the case of Swedish socialists’ support of Norwegian independence in 1905 and 
argues that the support for national secession forms ‘fraternal class solidarity’ among 
the working-class people. By recognising the ‘right of the Norwegians to secede’, 
the Swedish workers challenged the ‘privileges of the Swedish bourgeoisie and 
aristocracy’ and consequently demonstrated the ‘progressive nature’ of supporting 
weak nations’ self-determination (Lenin, 1964, pp. 435-529). By the year 1916 
during World War I, Lenin developed the thesis further and elaborated the intricate 
entanglement between national self-determination and internationalism. He states that 
those who ‘repudiated’ the national problem ‘in the name of the social revolution’ are 
the Proudhonists. The true Marxists have ‘mainly the interests of the proletarian class 
struggle in the advanced countries’ in mind (Lenin, 1964, pp. 150-151). In this sense, 
the Great Russians could only achieve liberation by supporting the self-determination 
of the oppressed nations out of the spirit of internationalism. 
In China’s case, the national question bears a two-fold characteristic. On the one 
hand, the Chinese Empire, similar to the old empires in the East, were put under 
pressure of global colonial expansion in the 19th century. On the other hand, its 
ethnic diversity brought forward an internal power dynamic with the ruling class 
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and ethnic groups, mainly the Han nation, as the oppressor of the ethnic minorities. 
The Chinese communist revolution, therefore, has to combat imperialism and Han 
Chauvinism to achieve the liberation of the Chinese people (Mao, 1983, pp. 242-
243). To the CCP, the broadly accepted theoretical norm is Marx’s take on religion 
as an ideological reflection of a fundamental socio-economic oppression. Similarly, 
the identification of ethnic differences was not driven by the physical anthropological 
interest in understanding the biological characteristics scientifically but to address 
the political problem of a global inequality manifested as ‘national questions’ due to 
the highly diverse levels of socio-economic development and modes of production 
among regions. 
With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the institutional arrangement of PRC’s 
central government reflects CCP’s take on religious and ethnic issues as components 
in the national mission of socialist transformation. This take was based on two moral 
ideals, namely the pursuit of equality and the promise of human liberation. Since 
the liberation is the ultimate salvation yet to come, the pursuit of equality becomes 
the moral guideline in daily political practices. In this sense, the ethnic affair was 
prioritised by having a cabinet-level institute underneath the State Council known as 
the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of the People’s Republic of China (中兰人民共
和国国家民族事务委员会).9 The religious affair was regulated under the authority 
of State Administration for Religious Affairs, a sub-ministerial level under the State 
Council. Under the party organisational structure, ethnic and religious affairs are 
still part of the United Front works (tongzhan gongzuo, 统战工作) and oversaw by 
the second bureau of the United Front Work Department under the command of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 
Apart from the apparent Soviet influence, the PRC’s take on religious affairs in 
association with ethnic issues reflects a unique socio-political condition in China. To 
the CCP, a modern Chinese revolution entails a two-stage transformation. It firstly is 
a political revolution that overthrows the Ancien Régime. The success of the political 
revolution marks the beginning of persistent pursuit of a social revolution, which 
ultimately will not only transform the nation according to the socialist vision of 
9 Before the 1954 reform, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission was under the direct management of the 
Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government (中央人民政府政务院). The 
1954 Constitution reformed the governmental structure and introduced the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院), a much bigger administrative authority chaired by the 
premier. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission was temporary suspended between 1970 and 1978. Since 
1978, it had been a department in the State Council. The 2018 central government institutional reform put 
the State Ethnic Affairs Commission under the leadership of the United Front Work Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中共中央统一战线工作部), a party organisation 
under the Central Committee of the CPC (中国共产党中央委员会). The State Ethnic Affairs Department 
continues to be part of the State Council. But the 2018 reform reintroduces a stronger presence of the 
party’s leadership in ethnic affairs and reinforces the importance of ethnic affairs as a United Front work. 
Similar reform also applies to the leadership of religious work. It was put back under the United Front Work 
Department (see Zhonggongzhongyang, 2018).
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modernisation but more importantly ensure the rise of the political consciousness 
of the Chinese people. The national revolutionary agenda is also firmly fused with a 
Marxist internationalist vision of human liberation, which, in the PRC’s discourse, 
could be achieved through the third world national independence movement, or 
generally speaking, the global resistance against imperialism. 
The Chinese Understanding of the National Question
The fall of the Qing Empire also presented a thorny problem to the inheritors of 
its sovereign. Both the Republic of China and the PRC had to face the challenge of 
nation-building among the ethnically diverse peoples inhabited in the vast territorial 
span. How to bring the dispersed peoples, who had long experienced ignorance, 
distrusts and even aversion to each other closer and form a coherent national identity? 
How to avoid going down the same route of devolution or disintegration as most of 
the empires in the 20th century? These problems are more practical than theoretical 
comparing to the discussions on the ‘national question’ within the international 
Communist movement. 
To the CCP, the identity building revolves around the making of the ‘Zhongguo 
Renmin’. Renmin (人民, people) connotates a collective subjectivity formed by liberated 
and aware individuals. It transcends the class and national boundaries. The attributive 
word Zhongguo (中国, Chinese) gives the universal concept a national and historical 
footing. Zhongguo Renmin hence becomes the national identity, which inclusivity 
derives from the transcendence of the political ideal of Renmin. During the wartime, 
the Japanese imperialist was the common enemy to the Han, Hui, Manchurian, and 
Mongolian people in China. This shared experience accelerated the formation of a trans-
regional, cross-racial, and class-inclusive political recognition of a collective identity 
known as the Zhongguo Renmin (Mitter, 2004; Perry, 1995; Yin & Zhang, 2011).
Mao once gave an intriguing analogy which brought forward the essence of Remin 
as a transcendental concept. In his concluding remark for the Seventh National 
Congress of the CCP in 1945, Mao stated that ‘[o]ur God is none other than the 
masses of the Chinese people.’ (Mao, 1965, pp. 321-324). This speech was later 
given the title of ‘The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains’ (愚公移山) 
and made as one of the must-read writings available to the Chinese general public. 
We can see Mao using the similar analogy after 1949. During his meeting with Iraqi 
Culture and Workers Delegations in 1960, he praised the Iraqi Revolution in 1958 and 
condemned the US imperialism. ‘God will not forgive them’, Mao said. He further 
explained ‘People are God’ and history ‘belongs to people’ (Pang et al. 2013, p. 391). 
Mao was also ready to apply the same principle to understand the role of religion 
in the context of a communist revolution. Mao once gave a practical read toward 
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the need of working with religious groups in forming the unity of the people. When 
meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in 1959, Mao was asked about whether or not a 
Communist member should go to church. Mao suggested that ‘as long as the masses 
are still going (to churches), a Communist member could also go’. Mao said that 
Khalid Bakdash, the founder of the Syrian Communist Party, expressed the same 
concern about Communist members going to mosques when he visited China. Mao’s 
opinion was rather practical. Communists going to churches and mosques ‘were 
to get closer to and unite with the masses’. Although being atheists themselves, 
Communists should not deny the reality that ‘the masses still believe in God’ (Pang 
et al. 2013, pp. 188-189). Hence, to ‘get close to the mass and unite with the mass’, 
Communist members could even go to mosques and churches.10 To Mao, China and 
the Arab world were linked by the same purposes of anti-imperialism and national 
construction. This unity hence made China ‘friend’ and ‘brother’ of the Arab world. 
The Arab world, Mao stated, was also ‘our friend and brother’.11
Mao’s comments on religious issues presented a two-fold approach of the CCP 
in the making of Zhongguo Renmin. The political subjectivity of Renmin will form 
spontaneously with the presence of imperialism as a common enemy. It will also 
require the active social engagement from the Communist members, who, in Lenin’s 
sense, are the vanguard of the masses. In China’s case, the end of the anti-Japanese 
War in 1945 and the establishment of the PRC in 1949 marked the termination of an 
immediate common enemy who could threaten the survival of the nation. However, 
to the general public in the PRC, the termination of the Japanese invasion was only 
just a temporary and very much regional success in the global resistance against 
imperialism. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 reinforced such a conviction 
among the Chinese people. 
Apart from the imperialist aggression in East Asia, Chinese media also kept a 
close eye on the situation in the MENA region where the people’s call for national 
independence was high. It was through the support of the Arab people’s struggles 
10 Before the 1954 reform, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission was under the direct management of the 
Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government (中央人民政府政务院). The 
1954 Constitution reformed the governmental structure and introduced the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院), a much bigger administrative authority chaired by the 
premier. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission was temporary suspended between 1970 and 1978. Since 
1978, it had been a department in the State Council. The 2018 central government institutional reform put 
the State Ethnic Affairs Commission under the leadership of the United Front Work Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中共中央统一战线工作部), a party organisation 
under the Central Committee of the CPC (中国共产党中央委员会). The State Ethnic Affairs Department 
continues to be part of the State Council. But the 2018 reform reintroduces a stronger presence of the 
party’s leadership in ethnic affairs and reinforces the importance of ethnic affairs as a United Front work. 
Similar reform also applies to the leadership of religious work. It was put back under the United Front Work 
Department (see Zhonggongzhongyang, 2018).
11 This was mentioned in Mao’s meeting with the then president of Yemen Arab Republic Abdullah al-Sallal in 
1964 (Pang et al. 2013, p. 360)
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against imperialism that the transnationality of the anti-imperialist struggle became 
more transparent to the Chinese people. China was portrayed as the home front of this 
global struggle for liberation, which manifested in the other parts of the Afro-Asian 
world as direct military confrontations. 
The support of the global military struggles against imperialism was more than 
supplying goods and materials to the front lines. The then Chinese people were also 
immersed in the sentiment that supporting the brothers and sisters who were still 
entangled in the anti-imperialist struggles was morally just. The sense of fulfilment 
came with building a ‘new China’ (新中国, xinzhongguo) through revolution was 
carried further by a more universal conviction that the oppressed people have the 
possibility and capability of overthrowing the old hegemonic world order and build 
a better one across the world. Hence, not only participating the Korean War could be 
received as an initiative to ‘defend home and nation’, but also supporting national 
independence movements in areas much further away from China could be taken as 
a ‘national responsibility’ of the new republic. 
While supporting the anti-imperialist military struggles in the Middle East 
provided the ‘new element of sociality’ on a global scale after the World War II, 
allowing the ethnic groups to participate in the grand struggle against imperialism 
as parts of the large collective, the domestic development on ethnic policy (minzu 
zhengce, 民族政策) helped to consolidate the CCP’s promise of building a better 
and more equal society.  Articles 50 to 53 in the Common Program of The Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (later refers as the Common Program), a 
provisional constitution of the PRC adopted in 1949, laid the fundamental principle 
of Chinese ethnic policy. The PRC is regarded as ‘a big fraternal and co-operative 
family composed of all its nationalities’, which are ‘equal’ to each other. The 
formation of such a fraternal family falls on the shoulders of ‘all nationalities within 
the boundaries of the PRC’. They should ‘oppose imperialism’ and ‘establish unity 
and mutual aid among themselves’ (“Zhongguorenmin Zhengzhixieshang,” 1953, p. 
1.). Apart from stating the legal and political equal rights, the Common Program 
also criticises the Han chauvinism and states the ‘freedom to develop their dialects 
and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs.’ 
(“Zhongguorenmin Zhengzhixieshang,” 1953). 
In this context, Islam received more attention as a transnational cultural identity 
in the discussion of ‘national question’ in the PRC. It was then treated as a cultural 
heritage that enhanced the common connection between Chinese people and the 
Muslim population in the Afro-Asian nations. Deng Yingchao, the vice-president of 
the All-China Women’s Federation and wife of Premier Zhou Enlai, presented an 
image of pan-Asian solidarity across all Asian nationalities (minzu, 民族) in her report 
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to the All-Asian Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1949. Islamic culture, ‘centred 
in the Middle East’, together with other ‘highly developed and sophisticated cultures 
across Asian nations’ were ‘momentous contributions to world civilisation’. Deng 
acknowledged that in the modern period12 the development of Asian ‘ethnic people’ 
(gezu renmin, 各族人民) were lagging behind. This, however, according to Deng, 
was due to the ‘brutal oppression, excessive exploitation, and obscurantist policy 
implemented by foreign imperialists and national reactionaries’. 13 This Congress 
had official representatives from 15 nations, among which were Lebanon, Syria, and 
Iran. Israel also participated in this Congress. Narrating the cultural subjectivity of 
Asia challenged the colonial discourse on the Asiatic backwardness. The ‘struggle’ 
(douzheng, 斗争) against imperialism constituted the foundation of the political 
subjectivity of the Asian people (Xinhuashe, 1949, p. 1).
Deng’s speech presents a Communist political take on Islam on an international 
stage. Islam is seen as a cultural heritage formed with material development. Hence, 
the repression of an individual culture is, in fact, suppressing or exploiting the 
physical advancement of a group of people who share a similar cultural heritage. 
This statement is responding to the 19th century Western theory of civilisation, 
which is associated with the idea of ethnonationalism and used to justify the colonial 
expansion in the non-Western world as the mission civilisatrice. To the early CCP 
members, the national independence movements from the non-Western world were 
the main components in the global resistance against imperialism and colonialism. 
Such movements were not only a political one but more importantly a cultural one. 
In the Chinese revolutionary context, independence can only be achieved through 
people’s emancipation14 in three aspects, namely political, economic, and cultural.15 
The same principle was used to understand the Third World national independence 
movements. Since national independence is merely a gateway leading towards 
the ultimate human liberation, it is important to articulate the political mission of 
national independence in the context of the internationalist ideal of equality. The CCP 
uses the term ‘new patriotism’ to enunciate the departure from the ‘old’ self-centred 
nationalism rooted in the European historical context. In the 1950s’ context, such a 
new patriotism contained devotion to both the socialist construction on a domestic 
level and safeguarding peace through anti-imperialism on an international level. 
12 Mao stated this opinion when he met with the General Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party Khalid 
Bakdash in 1959. He expressed the same idea to Nikita Khrushchev later (Pang et al. 2013, pp. 188-189). 
13 This was mentioned in Mao’s meeting with the then president of Yemen Arab Republic Abdullah al-Sallal in 
1964 (Pang et al. 2013, p. 360). 
14 In Chinese official historiography, modern (jindai) refers to the period between 1840 when the First opium 
war broke out and 1949 when the PRC established. 
15 ‘Yazhou Funv wei Minzu Duli Renmin Minzhu yu Shijieheping er Douzheng’ (Asiatic Female fighting for 
national independence, people’s democracy and world peace), People’s Daily, December 12, 1949, page 1. 
Also, ‘Yazhou Fudaihui Ding Jinri Kaimu’ (The Asiatic Female Congress will open today), People’s Daily, 
Dec. 10, 1949, page 1.
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With the newly established republic, some Chinese Muslim scholars began to 
articulate an extra layer of devotion. Wen Xingsan (闻省三), a prominent Muslim 
scholar and pro-national activist during the anti-Japanese period, proposed ‘four 
missions’ for the Muslim in the PRC. He states that the self-cultivation of a good 
Muslim draws inspirations from two main sources. ‘The Qu’ran teaches us the 
importance of Tawḥīd’. From the ‘viewpoint of the people’, Chinese Muslim should 
also ‘love the motherland, be determined, constantly raise our political awareness, 
learn the policies and laws of our nation, obey the law, and strengthen the devotion 
to the nation and the people to increase the power of national-construction.’ (Wen, 
1957, p. 13). Wen’s discussion responds to the PRC’s general principle on the 
religious issue, which requires the religious groups to ‘love the country and religious 
organisations’ (爱国爱教) at the same time. Muslim scholars in the early PRC 
period were eager to communicate their devotion to the nation-building agenda by 
actively participating in major state organised events. They also actively published 
commentaries and essays in the Chinese-speaking national media, backing the state 
positions on various issues with religious teachings. In the 1950s, one of the most 
important topics which attracted the Chinese Muslim scholars’ attention was the call 
for anti-imperialism.
The discourse of a global struggle against imperialism enabled the CCP to encompass 
the transnationality of Islam and address to the Arab world directly through such a 
bond. Chinese Muslim scholars played a key role in the process. In 1950, soon after 
the outbreak of Korean War, Ma Jian, a prominent Chinese Islamic scholar trained 
at Al-Azhar University and vital member in the CIAPC, published a short article in 
the People’s Daily stating that the imperialists, particularly the US imperialist were 
the ‘arch nemesis of Islam’. Ma Jian described Islam as a religion of resistance by 
quoting from the Qu’ran verses 2:256, 18:29, 39:14 and 15. He harshly criticised 
the missionary work of Samuel Marinus Zwemer among the Chinese and south-east 
Asian Muslims as an instrument of American imperialism. Hence, competing for 
religious freedom among the Hui and other Muslim minorities in China became a 
part of the transnational struggle against imperialism. The article ends with a call 
for the arm to all the Muslim ‘brothers and sisters’ across different ethnic groups to 
‘contribute your powers’ to resist against ‘American invasion’, defend ‘your religion’ 
and ‘your motherland’, and to ‘safeguard global peace’ (Ma, 1950, p. 3).
With the establishments of the CIAPC in 1952 and the IAC in 1953, the Chinese 
Muslims quickly became the champion in advocating the ‘new patriotism’ on both 
national and international levels. Chinese Muslims, as the letter sent to Mao Zedong 
on the launching day of the CIAPC, suggests, enjoy the rights of ‘ethnic equally 
and religious freedom’ in the ‘big fraternal family’. The IAC that ‘we are preparing 
for’ will ‘assist the people’s government to implement the religious policy coined 
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in the Common Program’. Together with ‘other fraternal ethnic groups in China’, 
the Chinese Muslims ‘turned from slaves to masters’ of the country. To cherish this 
hard-earning happiness, the Chinese Muslims will ‘strive for ‘ethnic solidarity’, the 
‘defence of motherland’ and ‘world peace’ (“Zhongguo Yisilanjiao,” 1952, p. 1).
CIAPC was quick in fulfilling its mandate. In 1952, in preparation for the Peace 
Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, the CIAPC made its proper appearance 
to the Chinese general public. The conference was scheduled to be held in Beijing 
from October 2 to 12, 1952, with the purpose to support the post-war ‘economic and 
cultural reconstruction’ in the world through the broad discussion on ‘safeguarding 
the perpetual peace of the world’. According to Ma Jian, the mandate of this Peace 
Conference was in line with the mission of ‘national independence in the Islamic 
countries as well as the rest of the world’ (Ma, 1952). At the same time, the PRC 
was involved in the Korean War. As a case of direct military intervention, the 
Korean War was associated with struggles for national independence in the Islamic 
world. Speeches from Iranian and Iraqi delegates pointed out that ‘the glorious and 
brave struggles for peace and independence by the Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, 
and Malaysian people’ was not only a ‘power that inspires us’ but also ‘our role 
model’. ‘Strategic arteries’ such as ‘Suez Canal’ and ‘Çanakkale Boğazı’ were ‘more 
important than Korea’ to the imperialists (Rahimian, 1952, pp. 88-90). 
The CIAPC was essential in showcasing the religious freedom and ethnic 
equality in the PRC to the outside world. Its presence in major international events 
was usually received very positively. In the case of the Asian Peace Conference, 
‘seventeen delegates from India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Syria, and other 
Mohammedan countries met the Chinese Islamic Society to praise religious liberty 
in China and the fitness of Mohammedanism in a Communist order of things’.16 
Since then, the presence of Chinese Muslims on the international stage became a 
common practice helping to demonstrate the PRC’s non-hegemonic image to the 
broader third world nations. A famous example of using domestic political practices 
to communicate a devotion to international equality was Zhou Enlai’s speech in 
the Bandung Conference in 1955. When facing the accusation by former Iraqi 
Prime Minister Muhammad Fadhel al-Jamali that Communism was a ‘new form 
of colonialism’, Zhou responded with the example of the PRC’s ethnic policy on 
the treatment of Chinese Muslim. He suggested that with the principle of ethnic 
autonomy and religious freedom, the PRC was aware of the danger of imposing Han 
hegemony on the ethnic minorities in China. The PRC as a unified nation as a whole 
was never going to adopt hegemonic attitude when interacting with other nations in 
the World (Barnett, 1955; Enlai, 1990; Ma, 1952).
16 The CCP uses a colloquial term ‘fanshen’ when communicating this idea to the general public. Fanshen 
literally means rollover the body.  
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China as the Home Front of the Arab People’s Struggle against Imperialism
With hot wars for national independence in the MENA region, the PRC was 
self-portrayed as the home front of this long global resistance against injustice. In 
this sense, this belief was able to bring the idea of being part of a noble collective 
struggle for a better future for humankind much closer to the Chinese people living 
in peacetime, particularly after the end of the Korean War. Nation-building, in this 
context, was almost like a war-time social mobilisation that brought together people 
from different ethnic groups, social classes and religious backgrounds. The People’s 
Daily began to cover the events in Palestine as early as 1946, almost immediately 
after the military confrontations and tensions against the Western nations after the 
WWII in Algeria, Egypt, and Palestine.17 After 1949, the continuous armed struggle 
of the ‘Arab people’ against imperialism was communicated to the Chinese people 
through news reports, political movements, literary works, folk music, cartoons, and 
posters. The connection with the ‘Arab brothers’ was also reflected in people’s daily 
life through mainly agricultural produce which came through international barter 
trade with the Arab nations.18 Such a transnational temporality formed an experience 
of working towards the political ideal of ‘liberation of mankind’. Additionally, it also 
provided the Chinese people with a political purpose which went beyond the limited 
concern of national interests during the process of socialist construction. 
The support to the Arab people enabled the Chinese Muslims to further 
incorporate their religious conviction in line with the state’s political discourse of 
anti-imperialism in peacetime. It also allows the rest of the Chinese, mainly the Han 
ethnic majority, to get acquainted with the domestic Muslim population. Through the 
reader’s letter in People’s Daily, people were asking for ‘more introductions of Arab 
Islamic art, literature, history, and other general knowledge’.19 The People’s Daily 
quickly reacted by publishing translations of Arab poems, short stories, travel logs, 
informative pieces on Arab affairs, and sometimes even excerpts from the Qu’ran on 
its 8th page. Books of translated Arabic literature were published and made available 
to the general public. Chinese Muslim scholar also began to write essays on People’s 
Daily, introducing Arab people’s long history of resistance against oppression by 
using the Qu’ran as a crucial referencing point. In this internationalist moment, Islam 
was integrated into the Chinese political discourse of human liberation through anti-
17 It is under this principle that the CCP rationalised their objection against the Tibet secession movement. In 
the case of Tibet, the CCP’s argument is very similar to Rosa Luxemburg’s concern about Polish national 
independent movement’s incapability of achieving true freedom when the global imperial influences 
remained powerful in Poland. In 1951, the CCP stated that the Tibet independence would destroy the hard-
earned national independence and freedom, render the Tibetan people as slaves of imperialists (see  “Yonghu 
Guanyu Heping,” 1981, p. 34.
18 ‘Importance of the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference’ CIA Information Report, CIA-RDP82-
00457R015400020005-8. 
19 “Duzhe Laixin (Letters from readers),” People’s Daily, July 19 1958, page 8. 
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imperialism and became a revolutionary narrative. Ma Jian argues that people in 
modern time ‘enjoyed a much richer historical experience than the ancients’. Hence, 
we need to ‘provide new interpretations of the Qu’ran’. In his opinion, ‘do not quarrel 
with one another, or you may lose heart and your spirit may desert you’ is the Qu’ran’s 
teaching expressing the same idea of ‘power comes from unity’, which derives from a 
CCP’s slogan originated from the anti-Japanese War mobilisation. He argues that the 
historical development of the Arab world requires solidarity (Ummah). The Baghdad 
Pact nations broke the bond by serving as tools for imperialist invasion in the Middle 
and Near East. Hence, these countries betrayed the Qu’ran’s teaching of ‘help one 
another to do what is right and good; do not help one another towards sin and hostility 
(5:2)’. Condemning the Baghdad Pact as both immoral and unlawful in the context of 
Shari’ah, Ma Jian argues that the anti-imperialist war against these aggressors waged 
by the oppressed people is a jihad. Such a righteous war connects the ‘370 million 
Muslim across the world’ with ‘millions of peace-loving people globally’. Chinese 
Muslim, as part of the Chinese people, forms the solid foundation for the unity and 
‘provide the Arab brothers with moral and material supports to extinguish the war 
flame of invasion and safeguard world peace’.20 Reportedly, similar discussions 
occurred across the nation in many Muslim communities. Messages like ‘the warmth 
of the Arab people towards Chinese people’ were also communicated to the general 
public by Chinese Muslim who returned from Hajj through People’s Daily, forming 
a sense of international solidarity against imperialism among the oppressed people. 
From 1955 to 1958, the Sino-Egyptian interactions were almost the only tangible 
international relation that substantiated the rhetoric of the fraternal bond between 
Chinese and Arab peoples on Chinese national media. The disputes during the 
Bandung Conference reminded the CCP that the majority of the MENA nations 
perceived ‘colonialism’ quite differently. The grudge against the old colonisers such 
as France and Britain, as well as the fear towards the expansion of the Soviet-style 
communism, was more realistic to the MENA nations. Whereas the PRC’s main 
concern was the threat from the growing global influence of the US, especially its 
presence in China’s surrounding regions such as Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula, 
and Japan. Moreover, the 1956 Suez Canal even helped the US to gain a rather 
positive image among the MENA nations as the criticiser against the British and 
French colonisers (Westad, 2005, pp. 124-125). 
The outbreak of the Iraqi revolution in 1958 presented China with an unmissable 
opportunity. First, unlike the Suez Crisis happened two years ago, the US responded in 
1958 by sending a military force to Lebanon, fearing the nationalist movement in Iraq 
might threaten the US influence in the region. This sparked waves of anti-American 
protests in Egypt and some other MENA nations, which described by President 
20 Ma Jian, ‘Chongdu Gulanjing (Reinterpret Qu’ran),’ People’s Daily, Aug. 3 1958, page 8. 
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Dwight Eisenhower as a ‘campaign of hatred’ (Soliman, 2016, p. 137). Second, with 
the Arab world voicing their criticisms against the Western intervention, the call for 
safeguarding peace could potentially gain wider international public support. The 
seemingly arbitrary bridge between China and the Arab world based on the link of 
a shared cultural-religious background which only the Chinese Muslim could claim 
in reality began to gain its political substance through a de facto common-struggle 
against imperialist aggression. 
On July 14, 1958, at around 4 am local time, the Free Officers led by brigadier 
General Abdel Karim Qasim began the march on Baghdad. At 5 am, people heard 
the voice of Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif on the radio informing the public that the 
Royal House had been overthrown and that the Old Regime (Khadduri, 1969). The 
US and the UK responded to the event by sending troops to Lebanon and Jordan 
respectively.21 The PRC quickly reacted. From July 15 to 20, Mao and high-ranking 
officials were having overnight discussions about situations in Iraq, Lebanon and 
Jordan. In a meeting on July 20 attended by 44 members of Politburos and military 
generals, a consensus was reached that the Chinese military must be prepared to 
respond to the current international situation (Pang et al., 2013, pp. 387-388). 
In the meantime, the general public was mobilised voicing the people’s support 
to the Arab brothers and excoriation to the Anglo-US aggressors. On July 17th, 1958, 
people from across Beijing gathered in Tiananmen Square. At 4 pm Beijing time, 
Liu Ren, the then chairman of the Beijing municipal Party committee announced the 
opening of the ‘Conference on Protesting against the US Armed Invasion of Lebanon, 
Supporting the Republic of Iraq, and Lebanese National Independence Movement’. 
According to People’s Daily on July 18th, there were 500 thousand people participated 
in this conference. 
During the rally, Peng Zhen gave a short speech in support of the Lebanese people’s 
national independence movement and demanding the US imperialist army’s retreat 
from Lebanon. Peng condemned the US military move was an act of intervention. 
There was an Arabic translator on the spot, providing simultaneous translation of 
Peng’s speech to the UAR delegates attending the meeting. A group of foreign 
journalists were also attending the meeting, among whom was French director 
Claude Lanzmann. He was there as a correspondent for the famous left-wing weekly 
21 The US primarily concerned about losing influence on the MENA region in general and credibility of the 
US for ‘assistance in the event of need would be brought into question throughout the world’. The US 
was also worried about the spread of Nasserism in the region. Hence, an initially denied request from 
Lebanese President Camille Chamoun for military assistance in June 1958 was now accepted. Regarding 
the initial decision on President Chamoun’s request, see Smith (1992, pp. 109-110).The military intervention 
to Lebanon was initially implemented as a first step. The US ‘would have to be prepared to go into the 
whole area’. See Smith (1992, pp. 211-212). The British main drive to collaborate with the US on military 
intervention was to protect the sterling oil. On July 17, the Cabinet voted ‘for’ to send two battalions of 
paratroopers to Jordan. See Catterall (2011).
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L’Express. On July 24, readers of L’Express read about the ‘astonishing scene’ in 
Beijing. Lanzmann told his readers that there were street shows played by workers 
and students, re-enacting the event happened in Lebanon. People on Tiananmen 
Square saw the Arab people in shackles, the Arab dictator with whips, and arrogant 
US soldiers wearing black sunglasses, an image which many Chinese people were 
familiar with because of the Korean War finished less than three years ago at that 
point. On July 29, Lanzmann’s article was translated into Chinese and appeared in 
People’s Daily.22 The story of Chinese people supporting the Arab people on July 
17 reoccurred in many formats and read by Chinese across the nation. It became the 
foundation of an internationalist moment of ‘liberation of mankind’ experienced by 
many ordinary Chinese people. 
Peng emphasised in his speech that the Iraqi revolution was a ‘joint achievement’ of 
‘Iraqi people’, the ‘Arab people’, and the ‘people across the world who cherish peace’. 
It was considered a heavy strike on the ‘colonial rule of imperialism in the Middle 
East’ and would bring a ‘new wave’ of national independence movements in the Afro-
Asian world. The US military intervention in Lebanon was considered as a continuous 
imperialist threat of regional peace after the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 and the Syrian 
Crisis in 1957. Peng argued that the same oppression was inflicted on the Chinese people 
through the military presence of the US in Taiwan. Hence, linking the Chinese people’s 
resistance against imperialism with the struggle in the Arab world was not merely a 
historical rhetoric but more importantly was a contemporary matter of urgency. The 
resistance against Anglo-US imperialism presence in both China and the MENA region 
formed a global ‘struggle on the frontline of anti-imperialism and anti-invasion’.23 
The national mobilisation against imperialism created a political occasion 
which enables incorporation of the religious identity into the national identity. The 
mobilisation of the Chinese ethnic minority, particularly the Muslim population, 
was another essential element in this internationalist moment of supporting the 
Arab people. Islam as a shared cultural background between the Arab people and 
Chinese Muslim was strongly emphasised. By accentuating this collective identity 
of Muslim, Chinese Muslim group became a channel bringing the suffering from 
a distant land much closer to home to the newly independent Chinese people. In 
turn, by standing solidly in support of the Arab cause against foreign intervention, 
the PRC gained a moral high ground integrating the Islamic view of just war with a 
Chinese mission of fighting against imperialism through socialist construction. The 
message was delivered at the July 18th rally on Tiananmen Square. In addition to Peng 
Zhen’s speech, Imam Da Pusheng, the vice president of the IAC also gave a short 
22 “Yige Waiguo Jizhe Yanli de Beijingrenmin Fanqinlue Shiwei (The Anti-invasion rally through the eyes of 
a foreign reporter),” People’s Daily, July 29 1958, page 8.
23 “Zhongguo Quanli Zhichi Yi Li Liangguo Renmin de Zhengyi Douzheng (China fully supports the righteous 
struggles from the people of Iraq and Lebanon,” People’s Daily, July 18 1958, page 2. 
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sermon, stating the ‘support from Chinese Muslim to their Arab brothers’. He said 
that ‘Chinese Muslim stands together with the Chinese people to celebrate the great 
triumph of the Iraqis’. The US aggression was an ‘act of imperialism and Devil’. It 
was an ‘unscrupulous provocation to the Arab world and a threat to the peace in Asia 
and Africa’. The Imam emphasised that ‘loving your nation is part of the Islamic 
belief’. He quoted the famous phrase from Qu’ran and argued that a patriotic war 
against the US invasion was a ‘fight in God’s cause (2:190)’.24
On July 21, 1958, at a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China Pavel 
Fyodorovich Yudin, Mao Zedong mentioned that ‘it was difficult for us to conduct 
safeguarding peace movements, as people will say they were agitated by the 
communists.’ Hence, these movements had ‘very little influence’. However, the 
‘American and British invasions of Lebanon and Jordan became our advertiser’. Mao 
stated that ‘isn’t clear now that who stands for peace and who promotes war?’ To 
Mao, the change of affair in the MENA region suggested that ‘now the revolutionary 
force stored around the world will unite together under the slogan of safeguarding 
peace’.  Mao then drew a picture of a hopeful future that ‘anti-imperialist and anti-
feudal revolutions are fermenting across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.’ (Pang et 
al., 2013, 618-619). Mao had been highly praising the Egyptian nationalist movement 
since 1956 when the Suez Crisis occurred. In the opening speech of the Eighth 
National Congress of the CCP, he stated that the nationalist movement in Egypt 
should be understood in the global trend of ‘struggling for national independence in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America’ (Zedong, 1993-1999a, pp. 114-118). These ‘national 
independence movements’ were not ‘socialist revolutions’. But they were considered 
as the essential international force which could ‘support all the socialist nations’.25 
To the Chinese people, the political experience of supporting the Arab people 
was an internationalist moment that brought the Chinese and the Arabs together. 
It was also like a wartime social mobilisation that drew the Chinese people closer. 
The support of Iraq and Lebanese people happened at a vital point in the PRC’s 
history. In early 1958, the CCP government launched the Great Leap Forward, a 
radical political attempt to uplift the Chinese productivity through mass movement. 
The campaign was focusing on helping China to achieve economic independence. 
It was also a project aiming to assist the Chinese people to gain political awareness 
through socialist construction. During the month-long support of Iraq and Lebanese 
people, People’s Daily published numerous correspondences from workers, farmers, 
intellectuals, and students, stating that they wanted to help the Iraqi and Lebanese 
people through producing more steel, grains, and having technological breakthroughs. 
24 “Zhongguo Musilin Zhichi Alabo Dixiong (Chinese Muslim support Arab brothers),” People’s Daily, July 
18 1958, page 2.
25 Mao mentioned this opinion in his meeting with delegates from Union des Populations du Cameroun in 1959 
(Zedong, 1993-1999b, pp. 7-8). 
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During the campaign for supporting the Arab brothers, the political idealism 
of forming a unity with the Arab world was often given a humanitarian touch. On 
July 18, 1958, the eighth page of People’s Daily, which was usually devoted to 
literary works and the introduction of socio-political knowledge, published a poem 
by Yuan Ying together with a blurry picture of an allegedly Lebanese child.26 The 
poem depicts that when the US soldiers landed in Lebanon, this child’s ‘eyes narrow 
and lips tighten.’ The child is affirmative that ‘we, the Arabs, will drive those US 
invaders out’. It is ‘the world’s people standing behind this little kid’. This image of 
an indignant Lebanese child quickly caught the heart of the Chinese people. In the 
following months, stage plays, poems, and folk songs were written about this child, 
transforming him into the embodiment of imperialist brutality and heroism of the 
Third World resistance.27 
At the time, the narrative in the public domain was that by supporting the Arab 
brothers who were fighting on the anti-imperialism front line, China then became 
the home front in this long-lasting international warfare. People from all the regions, 
social classes, and ethnic groups were mobilised to support the righteous cause of the 
Arab people. The mobilisation under the spirit of internationalism was also associated 
with the General Line of Socialist Construction. Hence, workers and farmers were 
encouraged to participate in rallies and study groups about MENA affairs after 
working hours or during work breaks. Students’ attendance at rallies should also be 
in after class time. More importantly, it is encouraged to speed up the production and 
construction to support people in the Middle East. Activities from across the nation 
were meticulously recorded, some of which were also published in People’s Daily. 
Readers in China encountered stories like Ma’an’shan Steel Factory workers 
‘proposed to hit the invasive wolf by producing more steel and iron’, or workers 
from Quan’jiao County Machinery Factory posted Big-character posters after 
‘attending group meetings protesting against the crime of US and UK invasion 
of the Middle East’ stating that they ‘decided to work overnight in order to 
support the righteous struggle of the Arab people’. Miners and oil workers from 
Tongchuan in Shan’xi province stated that Chinese workers ‘swore to be the 
backup for the Arab workers’. Farmers were also enthusiastically involved in 
the demonstration of solidarity. In Yinxiang village in Shan’xi province, farmers 
‘were working overnight ploughing over 100 mu of land after finishing the group 
meeting condemning the crimes of US imperialists’. About ‘3000 farmers from 
Xinmin county in Liaoning province’ worked overnight to ‘fight the drought’ to 
‘strengthen motherland’s ability to safeguard the world peace and support the 
26 Yuan Ying. “Libanen yi Xiaohai (A small kid from Lebanon),” People’s Daily, July 18, 1958, page 8. 
27 For example, “Libanen Xiaohai (A Lebanese kid),” People’s Daily, July 27, 1958, page 8. 
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righteous struggle of the Arab people’.28 Similar reports from workers, farmers, 
shop clerks, and even business owners appeared on People’s Daily nearly on a 
daily basis from July to mid-August in 1958.
Conclusion
In the Chinese political discourse, Islam is officially recognised as a world 
religion and a socioeconomic system. In the context of the socialist revolution, the 
socio-political role of Islam does not always have to be in a contest with the state. To 
the broader Third World nations, it is not strange to witness that religion, religious 
groups, and religious thinking actively participating in the modernisation mission of 
nation-building. This historical reality requires us to further question the Eurocentric 
reading of modernity bearing a key characteristic of ‘secularisation’, hence the process 
of separating ‘state’ and ‘church’. Instead, we could investigate the role of religion, 
particularly the cohesion between religious and political forces in the universal mission 
of human liberation and socialist modernisation. The CCP, being a vanguard party, 
bears the idealistic mission of striving for human liberation. As the ultimate stage of 
people’s self-awareness, human liberation could only be achieved through people’s 
active involvement in gradual social transformations. In the case of the early PRC, anti-
imperialism and socialist construction were the two primary political goals allowing 
people to be politically engaged and consequently creating a common ground for 
recognition. Hence, religion was considered as merely another form of ideology which 
needs to be incorporated into the political mission leading toward human liberation. 
The CCP also recognises religion as a socioeconomic institution. During the 
process of socialist construction, the implementation of land reform policy in different 
regions was regularly challenging the interests of the local religious establishment and 
consequently causing retaliations. This tension constitutes another vital component 
in understanding the meaning of ‘secularisation’ in the Communist revolutionary 
context. However, despite the political and historical complexity in pushing through 
the land reform policy across China, the guideline principle and the utmost concern 
for the then CCP was to win the heart and mind of the people. 
Beyond this practical concern, there also lies an idealist vision of liberation. 
By mobilising individuals from across the nation to engage in a discussion about 
international affairs and world’s future, the people as a political identity could then start 
to acquire its connotation and subjectivity as the ‘drive behind the making of world’s 
history’ (Zedong, 1991, p. 1031). The vision depicted in Third World internationalism 
28 “Duochan Liangshi Duochugang Henhen Daji Yexinlang Anhui Shanxi Liaoning Renmin yi Shijixingdong 
Zhiyuan Zhongdong Renmin (Produce more crops and more steel in order to clamp down the wild ambition 
of the wolf, People from Anhui Shanxi and Liaoning supporting the Arab People with actions),” People’s 
Daily, July 24 1958, page 2.
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might be idealistic in the eyes of today’s people, notably through the lenses of political 
realism and pragmatism. However, in the context of the 1950s, when the war-torn 
world was eagerly redeeming itself from its brutal hegemonic past, the discourse of 
internationalism indeed provided new hope for people who believed in the new world 
order depicted in the UN Charter. It is in this moment of international solidarity that 
the needs for redemption, transcendence, and ultimately salvation, which are usually 
delivered through religion, were presented to the people through political practices. 
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